In 16-18th century Poland there were few trials of blasphemy, including interferences into Church services or processions. the severe verdicts, capital punishment included, were rarely executed. The most frequently punished for an outrage against Catholic religious feelings were plebeians. No special attention was paid to the possible offences committed by noblemen and magnates. Thus, nothing happened to Erazm Otwinowski who in 1564 trampled on a monstrance torn out from a priest leading a procession. A Calvinist Marcin Kreza who also committed such an offence in 1580 went unpublished too. At the end of century Stefan Łowejko, who publicly manifested his atheism, was not even imprisoned. Although in 1785 a young magnate Henryk Niemirycz, who publicly profaned a host, was sentenced to death. He survived because he left the country. As it shows a coat of arms usually was a good protection against the administration of justice, even in denominational matters.
The article aims to briefly present Peter Strawson’s view expressed in his seminal article Freedom and Resentment (1962). We start with certain remarks on the position of the article among other works by Strawson and on reasons of its vast popularity manifested by many modern authors interested in the issues of responsibility or free will. Next, we move on to the issue of interpretation of the central thought of Strawson’s work. To do this, we present the most common interpretation, which at the first glance seems to express the core of Strawson’s view in a fairly convincing way. Then we adopt a slightly different perspective on the main line of reasoning in the article in question and in this context we try to interpret its general message. We argue that the main topic of the article is the philosophical issue of punishment. For this is the problem which – if we are right – is the proper object of the debate between an optimist who is also a compatibilist and a pessimist who is also a libertarian.
Despite the universal condemnation of torture, the prevention of appalling practices of ill-treatment has not been achieved in the 21st century. The repugnant practice persists and even increases because of the disingenuous interpretations of the definition of torture and the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms. Notwithstanding the cogency of the absolute and non-derogable prohibition of torture, particularly regarding the treatment of detainees, nowadays corporal punishment as a punitive measure is arguably a recurring phenomenon in several former British colonies and in States where the legal system is based on Islamic Sharia. While several legally binding universal and regional instruments prohibit torture in general terms, with no specific definition, the scope of the Convention against Torture definition was narrowed down by the lawful sanctions clause. The universality of the definition has been undermined by the inclusion of this clause, since different States have different practices when it comes to lawful and unlawful sanctions. The intractable problem of the interpretation of the definition by the State-Parties and the lack of effective control mechanisms has perennially posed the greatest challenge with respect to compliance with International Human Rights Law. In light of the above, this article seeks to critically dissect the lawful sanctions clause within the context of corporal punishment.